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Europako Estatu askoren jarduera konstituzionalaren baterako ezaugarria ikertzea du helburu
azterlan honek. Baterako ezaugarri horren arabera, Estatuaren egitura plurinazionala da, bere
sistema federala edo unitarioa izanda ere, identitate politikoen bidez onartutako gutxiengo nazionalei
esker. Konstituzio Auzitegi aktiboak dituzten Estatu ez-federaletan oinarritzen da lana, batez ere.
Giltza-Hitzak: Gutxiengoa. Autoktonoa. Eskubide historikoak. Berdintasuna. Diskriminaziorik
eza. Nortasuna.
El objeto de este estudio es una característica común de la práctica constitucional de muchos
Estados Europeos. Esta característica común señala la estructura plurinacional del Estado, a pesar
de su sistema federal o unitario, mediante el reconocimiento de las minorías nacionales concedido
por sus identidades políticas. El trabajo se centra sobre todo en Estados no federales con Tribunales
Constitucionales activos.
Palabras Clave: Minoría. Autóctono. Derechos históricos. Igualdad. No-discriminación. Identidad.
Cette étude porte sur une caractéristique commune de la pratique constitutionnelle de nom-
breux États européens, qui met l’accent sur la structure plurinationale de l’État, malgré l’existence
d’un système fédéral ou unitaire, par la reconnaissance des minorités nationales octroyée par leurs
identités politiques. Ce travail analyse principalement les États non fédéraux, possédant des
Tribunaux Constitutionnels actifs. 
Mots Clé : Minorité. Autochtone. Droits historiques. Egalité. Non-discrimination. Identité.
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1. The issue to be approached in this presentation is a common feature of
the constitutional practice of many member States of the Council of Europe. This
common feature points to the plurinational structure of the State, regardless of
its federal or unitary system, through the recognition of national minorities quali-
fied by their autochthony. I will focus my analysis mainly in non-federal States
with active Constitutional Courts.
As the PCIJ said in the Greco-Bulgarian Communities Case in 1930 “the
existence of a minority is a matter of fact not of law” and if the definition of mino-
rities is difficult if not impossible, their sociological existence is doubtless. A
minority could be defined as a group of citizens in a non predominant situation,
permanent residents of a country and who display, in relation to the rest of the
population, objective and distinct characteristics that this group wishes to pre-
serve and develop.1
Objective elements, such as demographic size, non dominant position,  ethnic
features an so on, are connected to subjective elements such as a sense of soli-
darity, directed towards preserving one’s own identity.
The peace treaties of 1919 drafted an international system for the protec-
tion of minorities as semi-collective bodies, which at the time, were echoed in
some European constitutions. Boris Mirkine Guetzevitch, in a very well known
book in those days,2 said that the protection of minorities was one of the new
trends of post-war constitutionalism and an outstanding example of the recep-
tion of international law by domestic constitutional law. But this model collapsed,
as the whole League of Nations’ system, during the late thirties.
After the Second World War the general response to the question of minori-
ties only favoured the protection of individual rights. Equality and non-discrimina-
tion were supposed to be enough to guarantee human rights to everybody.
However, eventually, both constitution drafters and judges were forced to face a
different approach to minorities as collective entities and to accentuate their
guarantees. The reasons are manifold. In the first place, because the collective
dimension of essential individual rights, such as religious freedom, mass mee-
ting or labour rights, became apparent. Second, because culture is the objective
of a third generation of fundamental rights and culture is, by definition, collecti-
ve and increasingly appearing as the transcendental condition of possibility and
development of the very individual subjectivity. The Swiss Courts illustrates this
issue by recording the “unwritten freedom” to use the own language, which, at
the same time, poses all the questions related to classical fundamental rights as
those of expression or education. Finally, because if the incorporation to a mino-
rity group should be a free option in an open society, it is none the less true that
the protection of the group itself must be undertaken to prevent, both external
and internal erosion. 
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This may demand measures, such as declaring compulsory a previous incor-
poration in such cultural horizon as the group is. For instance through linguistic
immersion as the Spanish Constitutional Court said for Catalonia (S. 337/94). In
the same fashion, objective factors as ascendancy or the mastering of a minority
language, may also be demanded for a free incorporation into a minority group,
as the Constitutional Court of Slovenia established (S. 12,2, 98) or even its irre-
vocability. Examples are founded, among others, in Slovenia and Finland (in rela-
tion with the Laplanders). Consequently, fundamental rights infer cultural rights.
And from these arise collective rights that have given juridical shape to the mino-
rity itself.
In the light of the “Framework Convention of the Council of Europe on the
Protection of National Minorities” it seems that the adherence to a minority
could be a decision made at will. But domestic legislation and its interpreters
made clear the difference between “assumption of” identity and “choosing”
identity. The former cannot mean anything else but “testifying”, by a voluntary
decision of will, a given existing quality, an objective feature. By contrast the pos-
sibility of “choice” would mean that anyone has the right to choose any identity
from a range of available identities. As the Hungarian Parliamentary
Commissioner for the rights of National and Ethnic Minorities has underlined that
“a Hungarian citizen cannot freely choose –on the basis of a possible momentary
inclination– to which of the minority communities in a legal sense he wishes to
belong. Still, he does have the fundamental right to have and express real self-
identity”.3 The identity could be opted or rejected by the individual who has it, as
the Slovak law says, but, as it happens with the language, it is not his ownership
and it is not at his disposal. In a certain way he belongs to it.
Nowadays, politologists have determined two main issues. On one side, that
liberalism, to be consistent, must accept collective identity as that which enables
an individual to meet his or her possibilities of personal development as well as
an effective exercise of freedom and fundamental rights, many of which have as
well an undeniable collective dimension. The name of Kymlicka is the best
known among the defenders of these theses. Furthermore, this recognition may
take shape in many different ways, from multiculturalism to plurinationalism or
even cosmopolitan multiculturalism.4 On the other side, the possible risks for
democracy and the rule of law that may emerge from a multiethnic society have
been duly underlined. Let us remember Sartori for all others. And strong currents
of the liberal ideology continue to insist on the fact that, all in all, it suffices to
guarantee the equality of citizens against discrimination, both individual and
collective.
This is the doctrinal framework to explain the trends of current European
laws and practice in relations with minorities.
3. Annual Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights,
Budapest, 2001, pp. 13 ss. and Budapest, 2003, pp. 10 ss.
4. Cf. Cornewell and Stoddard (eds.) Global multiculturalism, Oxford (Rowman & Littlefield)
2000.
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2. With regards to European practice three main types of minorities have
been identified.
A) In the first place, the so-called classical minorities or national or ethnic
groups. That is, those communities of people who share cultural, linguistics, 
ethnic, religious, etc. features of their own, conferring a global identification to the
individual that belongs to them. The autochthonous or historical minorities,
whether they are national communities or not, are those that have been settled in
the Country for as long ago as it allows for presuming their stability and rooting and
are opposed to “de facto groups”. Such terminology has been used by the
Constitutional Court of Hungary and fits in with the distinction expressed in Poland,
Slovenia, Croatia, Slovak Republic and even Austria, based on the art. 7 of the
Treaty of Vienna. The same may be applied to the Laps in Norway and Finland.
In the lack of constitutional definition, autochthony is interpreted by the
Constitutional Court of Slovenia as immemorial presence (S 23,3, 2001) and
therefore extended analogically to the Gypsies although they are differentiated in
the Constitution (art. 65). Austria and Hungary, in their respective laws of 1993
share a similar situation where autochthony derives from the presence, respecti-
vely, of over a hundred years or several decades –between 25 and 90 years–.
Finally the concept of national minority in the Polish law is set aside for those
communities, the main body of which is to be found beyond the boundaries of
Poland (i.e. Germans) and consequently are minor branches of a nation that dif-
fers from the Polish. The Silesians, for instance, are not considered a national
minority but an ethnic group (Court of Appeal of Katowice, S. 24, 9, 1997). 
The qualification as “national minority” has little to do with the total size of
the minority population as the case of Frisians in the Netherlands shows –in rela-
tion with speakers of Low Saxon or Limburger5– and it is formally recognized in
Slovenia (art. 64), even if its quantitative presence in local districts is relevant to
obtain political rights, among others as the Austrian Constitutional Court said
(i.e. SS 12836/1991, 15970/2000 and 16404/2001) The logical rationale of
the distinction is that those minorities “contribute to the cultural wealth of the
Country”, as it is said in different Dutch instruments.6 They “participate in the
sovereign power of the people; they represent a constituent part of the State”,
as is stated by the Constitution of Hungary (art. 68,1) and implemented by Act.
LXXVII 1993. Even then, the State is based on two peoples, as is the case of
Norway with relation to the Laps.7 The Austrian Constitutional Court underlines
the value of identity from its S. 9224/1981 and the recognition and even pro-
motion of this value is the general trend, more or less actually effective, in the
new European constitutionalism.
5. Cf. Second periodical report presented to the Secretary general of the Council of Europe in
accordance with article 15 of the Charter (Strasburg 26 May 2003) MIN-LANG/PR (2003) 6, pp. 25,
182, 2003.
6. Ibid. Cf. Convenant on Fryssian Language and Culture (2001).
7. Cf. 1987 Act on the Sami Parliament and other Sami matters.
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The difference between those autochthonous minorities and the rest of classical
minorities considered as “de facto” groups and the other types later considered is
quite important when approaching the various protective techniques applied, since
the right to preserve and promote collective identity which in turn depends on the
strength of “national characteristics” are granted to autochthonous and historically
rooted minorities. These rights include national symbols and specific linguistic, cul-
tural and educational rights as well as political rights, practically vested in the group.
On the other hand, members of “de facto” groups are only granted non-discrimina-
tion, based on general protection of fundamental rights and the principle of equality.
As a matter of fact the Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner for National and
Ethnic Minority Rights has had no intervention in relation with immigrants.
Consequently, the primary question in regard to minorities designated as
classical is the safeguard of their identity. As far as they are object of positive dis-
crimination policies, the goals of those positive actions are the guarantee and
promotion of their identity, said the Constitutional Court of Slovenia (ss.
12,1,1998 and 28,1, 1999). 
B) A second group is made up by the new minorities which arise from the
recent massive migration and who share the same ethnic origin. Looking at the
U.S. experience, Kymlicka said that these immigrant groups are neither nations
nor do they occupy native lands and that their specific characteristics are mainly
expressed through family life and voluntary associations that do not contradict
their institutional integration. Therefore, even if they assert their identity and
refuse assimilation into the welcoming country, at least they do not try to esta-
blish a parallel society. According to Walzel,8 while the New World appeared thus
as the chosen land of immigrants inflow and some parts of the U.S were the best
example of a polyethnic society, the Old Continent only knew classical minorities,
historically settled and rooted in their territory.
However, present European experience is quite different. Migration has beca-
me accelerated and massive, a qualitative change because of its quantity and sud-
denness and practical assimilation of immigrant groups to national minorities is
directly proportional to their homogeneity, the strength of the bonds with the “mot-
her country” and the geographical proximity of these to the receiving State.
Actually, even if the immigrant group has no specific claim to identity, its numerical
size may affect or even threaten the receiving society’s identity, specially, if it suf-
fers from a special frailty, as it is the case of territories of small size or poor demo-
graphy. The factual base to distinguish, on the steps of Kymlicka, between polyeth-
nicism and multinationalism is becoming increasingly unclear. But the difference
between the autochthonous minorities and the newcomers is, from many points of
view, the capital issue of the legal approach to minorities. The first, as it is said abo-
ve, are structural elements of the State global identity; the second is an external
factor to this identity if not a threat, in spite of their economical and demographic
very positive contribution. Once more economical needs clash with political requi-
rements enacted in Constitutions and laws and implemented by the Courts. 
8. The Politics of Ethnicity, (Harvard University Press) Cambridge (Mass.), 1982, p. 9.
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The affirmative action or positive discrimination of the member of a minority
group is based in the protection of fundamental rights and the effective guaran-
tee of the equality principle and not on minority rights. Their goal is nor the pre-
servation of the group’s identity but the compensation of a previous situation of
real inequality. In this case the aim is equality; in the previous one the mainte-
nance of difference. The canonical interpretation of Helsinki Act does not include
newly settled groups under the protection of art. 27.
C) The third group of newest minorities, also called “cross-minorities”, is
made up by the social movements of women, homosexual, handicapped, etc...
rejected or disregarded until now when, precisely for that very reason, they claim
either an official recognition or a special protection or both at the same time.
This last category is undoubtedly heterogeneous compared to the first two alre-
ady described and only a excess of “politics of recognition” could confuse them and
risk the frustration of their respective aspirations. To put on the same level the
French-speaking minority and the Canadian deaf-mutes does not favour an adequa-
te treatment of both issues, even if Habermas supported such an original view.
Some social features may not base a global identity as it is the case for gender,
sexual behaviour or even religion in a secular era. Others, such as the handicapped,
should not propose to perpetuate their features, although this is not always clear for
some of them and Courts could share this view. But since the problem is daily rene-
wed with increased strength, light must be cast on the specific claims of each of the-
se movements. Be it protection against discrimination –the tolerance principle–,
promotion as the best way of integration –hypothesis of affirmative action or positi-
ve discrimination– or assertiveness and perpetuation of a different identity.
Finally and in the extent of those questions posed to the Constitutional Courts
whose doctrine I have analysed, the newest minorities have been handled upon the
bases of the non-discrimination principle and respect for the fundamental rights.
3. They are different criteria to classify the various constitutional techniques
for minority protection. A legal approach should distinguish between repealing
rights, that is the privileged immunity of the minority in relation to the general
rules; promotional rights, that is positive action to create appropriate conditions
enabling minority groups to preserve, express and develop their own identity and
fully participate in the life of the global community; and rights of self-govern-
ment.9 But from a material point of view, the three most important to be empha-
sized are: cultural autonomy, which could even be territorial self-government;
symbolic expression of identity; and specific political rights. I will omit descrip-
tions of bureaucratic organs of participation of minorities in the central adminis-
tration and of protective institutions such as the Ombundsman.
A) The first assumes recognition of fundamental cultural rights, not exclusi-
vely but primarily linguistic. A particular language assumes a particular culture
and thereby requires the specific laying out of both, expression and educational
9. Cf. Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear Oxford (OUP), 2000, pp. 127 ff. 
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rights. Chiefly, because they are instrumental for its preservation and develop-
ment. Think of the Swedish language in Finland –as a “de facto” minority which
is how the Finish authorities refer to it– Sami or Lap in Finland and Norway,
Danish, Frisian and Sorabo in Germany, German in Denmark and Italy, Frisians
and, on a different level, Lower Saxon, Limburger, Yiddish, Roma and Sinti in
Netherlands, Hungarian and Italian in Slovenia and a number of languages in
Poland, Croatia, Slovak Republic and, most of all in Hungary.
Recognition of a minority language usually implies that of a different culture –for
instance, Swedish traditions in the Island of Äland– and this leads to the recognition
of a whole field of cultural autonomy, its organisation and management by its own
people, which is most relevant when addressing education. Austrian Constitutional
Court has been a pioneer in this field when it declared that the right to receive edu-
cation in the “mother-tongue” is a personal right transcending the frame of territorial
autonomies (from S. 12245/1989 Now cf. S. 15759/2000). Other new democra-
cies of Eastern Europe followed the example, even in most radical terms as is the
case of the Sentence of 12, 2, 1998 by Slovenia’s Constitutional Court. 
However, since cultural and linguistic minorities tend to group together in
terms of space, policies of cultural recognition are bound to apply such recogni-
tion in the shape of autonomy granted to those territories where a majority of a
certain minority is found. Such is the case of German-speaking provinces of
Bolzano and Trento in Italy. Specific precautionary measures have been included
to this effect in some constitutions (i.e. Finland, arts. 121 in fine and 122) and
the previously mentioned Hungarian law of 1993 has carried this principle on by
foreseeing the self-government of a minority in a given territory when votes pro-
ve its majority presence. The Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner has under-
lined, over and over again, the unsatisfactory performance of the system that fre-
quently clashes with the local authorities.10 The Slovenian Constitution tends
directly to territorial selfgovernment of national communities (arts. 64 and 143).
On the other hand, territorial presence of minority population over a quota is
the condition of different cultural rights in the Slovak legislation.11
Territorial devolution, not only in linguistic matters, is also practised in many
other places where a national community exists as is the case of Spain, Belgium
or the United Kingdom or even when non national identities are recognised as
the Feroe Islands or Greenland in Denmark. But those cases went beyond the
politics of recognition of minorities and should be considered as juxtaposition of
different body politics in one State. Jellinek call that “Staatsfragmente”.12
10. Annual Report… Budapest, 1998, pp 35 ff.Budapest, 1999, pp. 11 ff. Budapest, 2003,
pp. 151 ff.
11. The Act on the use of minority language 184/1999 and the Act on denomination in langua-
ge of national minorities 191/1994 among others requiere that the citizens of a national minority
form at least 20% of the population to get those rights.
12. Cf. Allgemeine Staatslehre, Heidelberg, 1900, chap. 19, II,3 and Über Staatsfragmente,
Heidelberg (Köster), 1896. 
Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, Miguel: Minorities and Historical Titles: the Search of Identity
196 Rev. int. estud. vascos. Cuad., 3, 2008, 189-199
Despite this territorial imperative, the principle is often opposed by the per-
sonality principle, whereby minority rights are carried along, wherever they go, by
the members of the minority, like “the shadow follows the body”, without the
need of a territorial link. This personality principle is applied in all purity to a
nomad community lacking a territory, such as the Gypsies, expressly contempla-
ted in much legislation and in the Slovenian Constitution (art. 65). Many other
cases may be stated, such as the already mentioned interpretation of the
Austrian Constitutional Court which respect to Carinthia, specifically included in
the Slovenian Constitution in relation to Hungarian an Italian minorities (art. 64)
and confirmed by this country’s Court (S. 12,2, 1998). The double heritage of
the ancient Habsburg plurinational Monarchy and of utopian Austromarxism
(Renner and Bauer) could be the roots of this generous interpretation. Along the
same lines, in Western Europe, the Spanish “derechos forales” (civil law of some
territories) could be mentioned, in spite of the present trend towards the territo-
rialization of those laws as as factor of integration of a political identity which is
already territorial (vd. Law 3/1992 1 July of Euskadi, art. 10).
B) This link between identity and territory raise another question: the signifi-
cance of the second for the community that is settled in a particular area that
may hold a special symbolism. That depends on whether the land is just a “spa-
ce” to live in or a “place” qualified as “native land” or “ancestral home” or even
“gifted land” by the cathartic energy of the community. I have explain many years
ago the meaning of national territory as mythical space.13
Migratory movements can even change the autochthonous population into a
quantitative minority in such a way that the fundamental rights of those who now
represent the demographic majority and end up by reclaiming their collective
identity –as the Albanians in Kosovo– may seriously affect those people who con-
sider themselves qualitatively bound to a certain “place” that, for the same rea-
son, is something more than a simple “space”. 
That is why constitutional and legal restrictions to the freedom of settlement
and estate ownership in particularly sensitive territories not only exist, but also
will probably proliferate in the future. The principle of free circulation and settle-
ment, key to the European Union, emphatically proclaimed by legislators and
judges, yields over and over before such a territorial imperative. Exceptions to
the European Union general rules, justified by ecological considerations as those
established in Tirol or in Island territories as is the case of Man, or the use of
urban planning laws to induce demographic movements as those practised in
France or under study in the Spanish Canary Islands, could actually be explained
much better as policies to protect territorial identity. 
Territory becomes in this sense an integration factor of collective identity,
more symbolic rather than material. The reassessment of this symbolic expression
of identity itself which is mentioned in rules dealing with toponymy and traffic
signs (i.e Slovak law 191/1994), reaches its apex in the Slovenian Constitution
13. Cf. Homenaje a García Pelayo, Caracas, 1980, II, pp. 629 ff.
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(art. 64) and Slovenian constitutional practice, which guarantee the use of their
own national ensigns, to the Hungarians and Italians (the very Hungarian and
Italian flags and colours), both inside and outside the country (S. 28, 1, 1999).
C) Finally the attribution of specific political rights to minorities follows three
main guidelines. On one side, the already mentioned territorial self-government
on local basis (i.e Hungary art. 68,4; Slovenia, art. 64 Cf. SS. Constitutional
Court 22,3,2001 and 14,11,2002). On the other, the guarantee to practise cer-
tain rights, as expression and education on a privileged basis (i.e. Slovak
Republic Constitution art 34 and laws 184/199 on the Use of minority
Languages and 29/1984;184/1999; 308/2000; 619 /2003; 16/2004). Thirdly,
by conferring minorities a self representation in local and even State institutions,
either by facilitating their access through elimination of the minimum quotas
required to obtain representation (i.e Poland Law 12/4/2001, art. 34 Cf. S. of
the Constitutional Court of 30,4,1997), or by direct guaranteeing such repre-
sentation (i.e Hungarian Constitution art. 68,3) or even by way of awarding their
representatives a veto over such issues that may concern them specifically (i.e
Slovenian Constitution art. 64,5).
SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS ARISE FROM THE PREVIOUS APPRAISAL
1. In the first place the fact that equality, non discrimination and fundamen-
tal human rights, as well as protection of minorities, are not exclusive but alter-
native terms of the same option. They cannot be exclusive because human rights
are strongly related to the protection of minority rights, both genetically, and as
limitation of collective rights. The doctrine of different Constitutional Courts that
has been analysed is quite unanimous on the matter. They are alternative inste-
ad, because either way has two different objectives in view: the safeguard of indi-
vidual as such in the first case, and the protection of a collective identity in the
second. 
The dealing with Gypsies or Roma minorities in countries as different as
Hungary and Spain shows the difficult compatibility of both terms. The integra-
tion of Gypsies is a direct threat to their way of life and collective identity and as
the same time the preservation of their identity, through the teaching in their own
language, can induce the discrimination of this minority.14
2. Secondly, the rationale of the protection of classical minorities is not, as
new liberalism does insist, an extension and deepening of individual rights, but
the positive appraisal of particular identities in spite of its numerical importance
and because of its rooting in the global identity of the State whose “compo-
nents” those minorities are, as the Hungarian Constitution says (art. 68). 
Those are the case of the Sorbian, Frisian and Danish minorities in Germany,
of the Hungarians in Slovenia, the Slovenians in Hungary and different peoples in
14. Cf. Annual Report…, Budapest, 2001, pp. 24 ff.
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the Slovak legislation. On the contrary, the Hungarians denominated “de facto
groups” and “other peoples” –v.gr. Vietnamese– by the Slovak legislation, are
those that, whatever their number could be, lack such valuable characteristic of
historical identity, so that their members are individually protected against discri-
mination, but without recognition and support of their collective identity. So the
Gypsies who have been settled in Slovenia since centuries are, in spite of the
common negative bias of the global society, entitled to specific rights of political
representation, contrary to the recent and maybe better placed immigrants (vd.
S.14, 11,2002 of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia).
Many European countries follow the same criteria in their attitude to immi-
grants and the most recent French practise is decisive to such respect. Instead,
wherever the minority in question, no consideration taken of its numerical weight,
shows a historical identity incorporated to the global identity of the society into
which it is inserted, it becomes worthy of the safeguard of such identity. Thus the
Swabian leanguage is held under protection in Germany in the same way as the
Danish representation in Schleswing, but the is not special protection for the lan-
guage nor the political representation of the larger immigrant Turkish community.
The social reaction to the recent resolution of the German Constitutional Court on
the shador in the schools of September 24, 2003 is the best proof of it. The most
polyethnicist European system, that of the Netherlands, grants a status to histori-
cally-rooted languages (Yiddish included) which contribute to the “linguistic wealth
of the Country”, but the languages of Asian and African immigrants lack similar
situations in spite of their number.
Similar situations exist everywhere outside Europe. In large countries like
Canada –in spite of its drive from initial biculturalism and later recognition of
“inherent rights” of Indian natives to polyethnicism – and in microstates; in Latin
America as well as in the Far East. The search of historical identity is universal, in
spite of its political incorrectness. The explanation should be found not in Kant
but in Herder. 
3. Thirdly, it is obvious that the constitutional practice of those European
countries where minorities as such are recognized allows for an increasing dis-
tinction between the State and those nations of which it is made up, even whe-
re a hegemonic nation is recognized as it is the case of Polish, Magyar or
Slovenian. The Polish Constitutional Court on the art. 27 of the Polish
Constitution makes a clear difference between “the State language” and “natio-
nal languages” (S. 13, 5, 1997), and, as the Hungarian practice shows, the dis-
tinction is much more productive for the multinational working of the central ins-
titutions of the State (i.e. Parliament) than territorial bilingualism as it is
implemented in Spain.
The distinction between one State and its different component nations who-
se territories, languages, and symbols are carefully safeguarded leads to plurina-
tionality. But plurinationality has nothing to do with the split between “demos”
and “ethnos” proclaimed by Habermas because the plurality of ethnical identi-
ties contribute to build up the State as its structural components and beyond
them there is no “demos” at all, as the situation of new minorities shows.
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Plurinationality must neither be mistaken with a generalized policy of recognition
for all kind of multiculturalism. It is not the same to teach a immigrant from
Senegal to read and write in Bambara than in German in Bolzano or in Catalan in
Catalonia. The different nations, which are “structural components” of the same
State, are only those entitled by their historical rooting to this common owners-
hip. And this ownership is increasingly effective in many European countries.
The “historical titles” that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 recognized to
some national communities, meet now an unexpected parallel in the most
recent European constitutional practice. Because “Historical Titles” are the juri-
dical version –taken from the pre-national identities of the old Habsburg
Monarchy (the so-called historical-political entities)15– of the “political bodies”
whose existence is not a creation of law but a historical fact beyond the law–.
15. Cf. Herrero de Miñón, Idea de los Derechos Históricos, Madrid (Austral), 1991, pp. 41 ff.
